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Abstract
In liberalized electricity markets strategic firms compete in an environment char-
acterized by fluctuating demand and non-storability of electricity. While spot market
design under those conditions by now is well understood1, a rigorous analysis of invest-
ment incentives is still missing. Existing models, as the peak-load-pricing approach,
analyze welfare optimal investment and find that optimal investment is higher with
more competitive spot markets.
In this article we want to extend the analysis to investment decisions of strategic
firms that anticipate competition on many consecutive spot markets with fluctuating
(and possibly uncertain) demand. We study how the degree of spot market competi-
tion affects investment incentives and welfare and provide an application of the model
to electricity market data. Our results show that more competitive spot market prices
strictly decrease investment incentives of strategic firms. The reduction of investment
incentives can be so intense to even offset the beneficial impact of more competitive
spot market design. Those results obtain with and without free entry. Our anal-
ysis thus demonstrates that investment incentives necessarily have to be taken into
account for a meaningful assessment of proper electricity spot market design.
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1 Introduction
Incentives to invest in generation capacity have been heavily debated in the recent literature
on electricity market regulation. Many authors suspect that there is a trade–off between
low spot market prices and proper investment incentives if firms behave strategically. As
Paul Joskow (2008) puts it, ”policymakers in many countries are concerned that competi-
tive wholesale markets for electricity do not provide adequate incentives for investment in
sufficient quantities of generating capacity.” A thorough analysis of investment incentives in
electricity markets, even though crucial for regulatory policy and electricity market design
is still missing, however. In this paper we provide a model to analyze investment incentives
of strategic firms prior to spot market competition. We illustrate how different degrees of
spot market competition affect investment incentives and welfare, and how the desirability
of different spot market regimes changes depending on the degree of competitiveness of
investment behavior. We finally provide an application of the model to data of a specific
electricity market.
Notice that an analysis of the impact of spot market competition on firms investment
decisions, the central question of this article, necessarily has to take into account the fluc-
tuating nature of demand as observed in the case of electricity markets. Due to the limited
storability of electricity, demand and supply have to match at any point in time in those
markets.2 A model which abstracts from this property by assuming constant demand would
not only be less realistic but most importantly would eliminate the central problem analyzed
in this article.3
We thus analyze a model where investment takes place at a first stage prior to compe-
tition at the spot markets which are subject to fluctuating production cost and fluctuating
demand. Spot market competition is based on the concept of supply function competition
developed by Klemperer and Meyer (1989) and applied to the case of electricity markets by
Green and Newbery (1992). The range of equilibria generated by this approach is bounded
2Notice that the type of questions we analyze (the main feature is limited storability of the good) is
relevant also for a series of other markets. Examples are oil and gas extraction, capacity choices of hotels
and hospitals (e.g. number of beds), or capacity choices of airlines (number of planes), etc. Our main
motivation for this paper was, however, to get a deeper understanding investment incentives in electricity
markets, an issue which is not yet well understood for liberalized electricity markets.
3As shown in previous contributions for the case of constant demand (compare for example Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983)), the degree of spot market competition is irrelevant for firms’ investment decisions,
since firms can fully determine the outcome at the spot market by choosing their capacities. This is not
true under fluctuating demand, where invested capacities are either binding or idle. Spot market outcomes
are determined by investment decisions in the first case and by the degree of spot market competition in
the latter, which has an impact on firms’ investment incentives.
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below by the competitive market outcome and above by the Cournot solution.4 Which of
the equilibria is being played in a particular market likely depends on specific market rules
and institutions. As Borenstein et al. (2008) put it: ”To the extent that market rules and
local regulatory differences influence market outcomes by helping determine which of the
many possible equilibria arise, these impacts can be thought of as placing the market price
within these bounds.” Throughout our paper we stick to this interpretation of Borenstein et
al. (2008). That is, we limit our analysis to those two extreme cases, the Cournot and the
competitive solution.5 This approach will allow us to address the central questions of this
paper: “How does spot market design influence firms’ investment decisions and how should
desirable spot market design look like when taking into account investment decisions?”
We establish existence and fully characterize all equilibria of the strategic investment
game for both regimes of spot market competition (Cournot and competitive prices). We
then show that the lower bound of the above mentioned range of spot market equilibria (the
case of perfect competition, which is clearly more desirable from a short run perspective)
is potentially less desirable in the long run: A competitive spot market leads to strictly
lower investment by strategic firms and might even lead to a welfare reduction. In a model
with free entry (where firms enter the market as long as they expect to cover some fixed
cost of entry) a competitive spot market is even less desirable since it gives rise to a lower
number of active firms in the market. In the empirical part of the paper we quantify the
effects we identified in the theoretical part using data of the German electricity market. We
also compare the results we obtain for strategic firms with those obtained in a framework
where optimal investment is derived. This replicates results obtained based on the already
existing “peak load pricing” literature (see below), which is currently adopted to analyze
investment in electricity markets.6 We obtain exactly the opposite result: if firms are not
modeled as strategic players a competitive spot market is more desirable both, from a short
run and from a long run perspective.
This demonstrates that it is crucial to precisely model potential strategic interaction at
the investment stage in order to accurately assess the desirability of spot market design,
a failure to do so produces drastically wrong predictions. Let us finally review some of
the related literature. The traditional investment literature focused on the case of optimal
4Especially when uncertainty regarding demand at each single spot market is small, the Cournot and
the competitive solution are indeed the lowest and the highest equilibrium.
5In a dynamic investment game a continuum of equilibria at the production stage implies very imprecise
overall equilibrium predictions ranging up to the collusive outcome. One could alternatively consider
specifications of the supply function game that yield unique equilibria, as in Holmberg (2008). Those
scenarios would yield less investment than the case of Cournot competition at the spot markets, but more
investment than the case of competitive behavior.
6See, for example, Boccard (2009), Bushnell (2005), Cramton and Stoft (2005), or Joskow (2007a).
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(instead of strategic) investment decisions. The “peak load pricing” literature was initiated
by Steiner (1957) and Boiteux (1960) and is extensively reviewed by Crew and Kleindorfer
(1986) and Crew et al. (1995). In a recent contribution Joskow and Tirole (2007) show how
those results can also be extended to the case of perfectly competitive markets.
Two papers have analyzed strategic investment prior to a Cournot spot market. For the
case of a linear duopoly Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) show existence of a symmetric equi-
librium. Murphy and Smeers (2005) characterize equilibrium investment in the very same
linear duopoly setting, but allow for an asymmetric cost structure of the firms. The rela-
tionship between spot market design and firms’ investment decisions has not been touched
in those contributions, however.
As already mentioned above, there has been an intense debate of the question which
framework is best suited in order to model competition at electricity spot markets. Whereas
Green and Newbery (1992) proposed the supply function approach, an auction model was
proposed by von der Fehr and Harbord (1993). Recently, Reynolds and Wilson (2000),
Fabra and de Frutos (2006), and Fabra, Fehr and de Frutos (2008) have analyzed strate-
gic investment incentives in a duopoly prior to an auction-like spot market with price
competition.7 They show non-existence of symmetric equilibria (Reynolds and Wilson),
and characterize some of the asymmetric equilibria for the duopoly case (Fabra and co-
authors). It probably remains an unsolved question whether the supply function or the
auction approach models spot market competition more accurately. However, the analy-
sis of investment incentives prior to auction markets seems to be plagued by the lack of
existence results (of symmetric equilibira) and by multiplicity of asymmetric ones. This
makes policy evaluations or an analysis of the relationship of investment incentives and
spot market design rather difficult.
Finally, generalizing investment decisions to the case of strategic behavior can also
lead to the analysis of strategic timing of investment decisions. All above mentioned con-
tributions (including this paper) exogenously fix a point in time when firms make their
investment choices and focus exclusively on capacity levels chosen. In contrast, the ”real
option approach” analyzes the optimal timing of investment. Demand evolves according to
a stochastic process (typically a Brownian motion) and firms decide when to adjust their in-
vestment to increased demand levels. This literature has been initiated by Dixit and Pindyk
(1994), and has been applied to strategic games by Baldursson (1998) or Grenardier (2002).
In order to keep those models tractable, however, the authors typically assume that the
entire capacity is being used for production (the case that firms are unconstrained cannot
occur). That is, by assumption spot markets and most importantly the type of spot market
7Further interesting contributions based on the auction approach include Boom and Bhler (2007) and
Boom(2009).
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competition are not modeled explicitly, shifting levels of demand thus have to be interpreted
as movements of average demand in the long run.
Our paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we state the model. Section 3 contains the
theoretical analysis and results. We consider strategic investment in section 3.1 and welfare
optimal investment in section 3.2. In section 3.3 we provide a comparison of investment
levels in the scenarios we consider and show that the strategic approach reverts the policy
conclusion. Section 4 contains an empirical analysis, where we also discuss the welfare
implications of spot market regulation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We analyze an investment game where firms choose capacities anticipating demand and cost
fluctuations, and thereafter make output choices at a series of spot markets. We denote by
q = (q1, . . . , qn) a vector of outputs of the n firms at a spot market, and by Q =
∑n
i=1 qi
total quantity produced at that spot market.
Inverse demand in spot market θ is given by the function P (Q, θ), which depends on
Q ∈ R+, and the random variable θ ∈ R which represents the different demand scenarios.
All firms face the same cost function for each θ ∈ R, which we denote by C(qi, θ). The
random variable θ ∈ R is distributed according to a distribution F (θ), which specifies
relative frequencies of different demand realizations.
Remark 1 (Why a Continuum of Spot Markets?) We choose a continuum of spot
markets, which could be motivated in two different ways: First, firms bid for 8760 hours
each year and installed capacity serves for more than ten years. Thus, a continuum might
be an appropriate approximation. Second, also demand uncertainty might play a role since
firms typically cannot predict all future demand realizations exactly. This scenario would
certainly suggest a continuous framework and is also covered by our analysis.
We allow for a nonnegativity constraint on spot market prices. Let us denote by Q¯(θ)
the lowest total production quantity where the price equals zero in a given demand scenario
θ.8 If prices cannot become negative, the following regularity assumptions on demand and
cost have to be satisfied only for quantities Q < Q¯(θ), otherwise they have to hold for all
quantities Q ≥ 0.
8Whenever prices remain positive for all quantities we set Q(θ) = ∞. In order to ensure a bounded
solution we then have to assume limQ→∞ P (Q, θ) < Cq(0, θ) for each θ ∈ (−∞,∞].
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Assumption 1 (Assumptions at each θ) (i) Inverse demand P (Q, θ) is twice con-
tinuously differentiable9 in Q with Pq(Q, θ) < 0 and Pq(Q, θ) + Pqq(Q, θ)qi < 0.
(ii) C(qi, θ) is twice continuously differentiable in qi with Cq(qi, θ) ≥ 0 and Cqq(qi, θ) ≥ 0.
Assumption 2 (Monotonicity Assumptions regarding θ) (i) P (Q, θ) and
C(qi, θ) are differentiable in θ, and it holds that Pθ(Q, θ)− Cqθ(qi, θ) > 0.10
(ii) P (Q, θ)qi−C(qi, θ) is (differentiable) strict supermodular in qi and θ, i. e. Pθ(Q, θ)−
Cqθ(qi) + Pqθ(Q, θ)qi > 0.
The situation we want to analyze is captured by the following dynamic investment game.
At the investment stage firms simultaneously build up capacities x = (x1, . . . , xn). Capacity
choices are observed by all firms. Cost of investment K(xi) is the same for all firms and
satisfies
Assumption 3 (Investment Cost) Investment cost K(xi) is twice continuously differ-
entiable, with Kx(xi) ≥ 0 and Kxx(xi) ≥ 0.
Facing the capacity constraints inherited from the investment stage, firms simultane-
ously choose outputs at a sequence of spot markets with fluctuating demand levels. Since
demand in a particular scenario θ is known prior to the output decision, produced quantities
depend on the respective demand scenarios.
Finally, we state firm i’s profit from operating if capacities are given by x and firms
plan to choose feasible11 production schedules q(θ) for all θ ∈ [−∞,∞].
pii (x, q) =
∫ ∞
−∞
[P (Q (θ) , θ) qi (θ)− C (qi (θ) , θ)] dF (θ)−K (xi) . (1)
9Throughout the paper we denote the derivative of a function g(x, y) with respect to the argument x,
by gx(x, y), the second derivative with respect to that argument by gxx(x, y), and the cross derivative by
gxy(x, y).
10Notice that demand and cost fluctuations in principle can be distinct processes. Then the parameter θ
represents all joint realizations, which have to satisfy assumption 2. This requirement imposes some further
restrictions on the model if cost and demand fluctuations should be considered simultaneously. Consider,
for example, a model with linear demand P (Q, β) = β−bQ and fluctuating but constant marginal cost c(γ).
For ease of exposition let both, β and γ follow a discrete distribution. Now sort all joint realizations (β, γ)
such that β− c(γ) is increasing and index each realization by θ. Observe that the resulting system satisfies
assumption 2 (i) and 2 (ii). Thus, the model can deal simultaneously with cost and demand fluctuations
in the case of linear demand, which we exploit in the empirical part of the paper. In case of non–linear
demand it is more plausible to think about demand and cost fluctuations separately.
11That is, 0 ≤ qi(θ) ≤ xi for all θ ∈ [−∞,∞], i = 1, . . . , n.
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Throughout the paper we consider only cases where investment is gainful,
i.e.
∞∫
−∞
[P (0, θ) − C(0, θ)]dF (θ) > K(0). Note that if the condition does not hold, no
firm invests in capacity.
3 Results
In this section we analyze the investment game where firms simultaneously invest in capacity
anticipating spot market competition in a series of markets with fluctuating demand. In
order to be able to assess the impact of market power and of market design on investment
incentives and production, we analyze four different scenarios.
In section 3.1 we consider the case that strategic firms choose profit maximizing invest-
ment levels. In this context we consider two extreme scenarios, the case of anticipation of
high spot market prices (Cournot) as well as the case of competitive pricing (which may
be a result of regulatory intervention12 or just the result of competitive supply function
bidding).
In section 3.2 we analyze the investment game assuming that socially optimal investment
levels are chosen by the firms (i.e. we analyze unstrategic investment choice), and again
consider the case of anticipation of high spot market prices as well as the case of competitive
pricing at the spot market. The latter case coincides with the ”competitive benchmark”
that has been analyzed in the peak load pricing literature. On the one hand, an analysis of
welfare optimal capacity levels yields insights on capacity levels that a social planer would
like to implement. Comparison with strategic capacity choices as analyzed in section 3.1
reveals, moreover, that the policy conclusion is reverted when the analysis does not account
for the incentives of strategic firms at the investment stage.
3.1 Strategic Investment
Consider the market game where firms strategically choose capacities as to maximize prof-
its. Our first theorem shows that the investment game where firms engage in Cournot
competition at the spot markets (SH — Strategic firms, High spot market prices) has a
unique and symmetric equilibrium. If, however, firms anticipate competitive prices at the
spot market (SL — Strategic firms, Low spot market prices), the investment game has
multiple symmetric but no asymmetric equilibria.
12We are aware that regulation down to spot market prices requires a lot of information on the part of
the social planer. Although stylized, however, it allows detailed insights in what happens to investment
incentives should the regulator succeed in implementing competitive prices at the spot market.
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Theorem 1 (Strategic Investment Choice) Suppose firms choose their capacities
strategically.
(SH) If firms anticipate high spot market prices (Cournot competition) at the spot markets,
the investment game has a unique equilibrium which is symmetric.
(SL) Suppose that firms anticipate competitive pricing at the spot markets, and that Cq(q, θ)
is constant in q. Then, there exists at least one symmetric equilibrium, but there may
be more than one. No asymmetric equilibria exist.
Total equilibrium investment in scenario SD, D ∈ {H,L}, XSD, solves∫ ∞
θD(XSD)
[
P
(
XSD, θ
)
+ Pq
(
XSD, θ
) XSD
n
− Cq
(
XSD
n
, θ
)]
dF (θ) = Kx
(
XSD
n
)
,
where θD
(
XS
)
is the demand scenario from which on firms are capacity constrained at the
spot market.13
Proof See appendix B 
Let us emphasize some important aspects of our results. First, we could show that
under standard regularity assumptions the investment game has a unique equilibrium if
firms expect Cournot competition at the spot markets. Second, we find that equilibrium
investment can be characterized by a rather intuitive condition. The condition simply says
that marginal profit generated by an additional unit of capacity (at the spot markets) must
equal marginal cost of investment. When calculating the marginal profit generated by an
additional unit of capacity, however, one has to take into account that additional capacity
affects a firm’s profit only in those states of nature where capacity is binding. Thus, only
those spot markets are taken into account where firms are indeed capacity constrained,
i. e. only the interval [θD
(
XSD
)
,∞] is relevant, not the whole domain of θ.
Note that the critical demand scenario θ (from which on firms are capacity constrained)
depends on the degree of market power at the spot markets. If firms strategically withhold
production at the spot market (as under Cournot competition) the critical demand scenario
is higher than in the case where they behave competitively. Observe that actually the
market game at the spot markets enters into the first order condition solely through the
critical demand realization.
If firms anticipate competitive behavior at the spot markets, existence and uniqueness
of a symmetric equilibrium cannot be shown in the general case (part (SL) of the theorem).
13I.e. θH(XSH) is implicitly defined by P (XSH , θH) + Pq(X
SH , θH)X
SH
n = Cq(
XSH
n , θ
H) and θL(XSL)
is implicitly defined by P (XSL, θL) = Cq(
XSL
n , θ
L), respectively.
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Only for constant marginal production cost we obtain existence (but not uniqueness).14 An
immediate insight of this result is that regulatory intervention at the spot market (that
forces prices below the Cournot level) may lead to high strategic uncertainty for the firms.
Later in section 3.3 we will show that, moreover, investment incentives are lower if firms
anticipate competitive prices at the spot market than in the case where they anticipate
Cournot competition.
3.2 Optimal Investment
In this section we characterize investment levels that are optimal from a welfare point of
view — again for a Cournot and a competitive spot market market outcome. The analysis is
interesting for two reasons: First, from a comparison with the results of section 3.1 we learn
how a social planer would like to influence the capacity choices of strategic firms. Second,
the analysis reveals that the traditional approach (which does not account for strategic
investment) predicts higher investment prior to competitive spot markets, while strategic
firms actually invest less if the spot market is more competitive.
Optimal investment in cases WH (Welfare optimal investment at High spot market
prices) and WL (Welfare optimal investment at Low spot market prices) is characterized
in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Welfare Optimal Investment Choice) Welfare maximizing industry
capacity choices are unique and symmetric. Socially optimal capacity in scenario WD,
D ∈ {H,L}, XWD, solves∫ ∞
θD(XWD)
[
P
(
XWD, θ
)− Cq ( 1
n
XWD, θ
)]
dF (θ) = Kx
(
1
n
XWD
)
, (2)
where θD
(
XWD
)
is the demand scenario from which on firms are capacity constrained at
the spot markets.15
Proof See appendix C 
Note that also the characterization of welfare optimal investment levels is rather intu-
itive. The condition implies that in the welfare optimum capacity should be chosen such
14The basic problem is that in neither case the profit is quasiconcave, which makes standard analysis
impossible. In the case of linear marginal cost, however, we can exploit recent insights on oligopolistic
competition that makes use of lattice theory (Amir (1996) and Amir and Lambson (2000)). In the general
case (i. e. strictly convex production cost), however, the game cannot be reformulated as a supermodular
game and thus, even those more sophisticated techniques do not help.
15I.e. θH(XWH) is implicitly defined by P (XWH , θH) + Pq(X
WH , θH)X
WH
n = Cq(
XWH
n , θ
H) and
θL(XWL) is implicitly defined by P (XWL, θL) = Cq(
XWL
n , θ
L), respectively.
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that expected marginal social welfare generated by an additional unit of capacity [LHS of
(2)] should equal marginal cost of investment [RHS of (2)]. Again it is important to notice
that only those scenarios are taken into account where firms are actually constrained given
the scheduled spot market production, that is, over the interval [θD(XWD),∞]. Note that
for a given level of investment, firms are constrained earlier if they behave competitively
at the spot markets, since under Cournot competition they withhold quantity at the spot
markets in order to affect prices. Consequently, additional capacity is used more often and
thus, contributes more to expected marginal welfare if the spot market behavior is more
competitive. This implies that welfare maximizing capacity should be higher if the spot
market is competitive than in case firms play the Cournot outcome. We show this formally
in section 3.3.
We finally point out that if firms do not act strategically, investment and production
levels coincide with the socially optimal solution, again given the number of firms:
Remark 2 (Non-Strategic Firms) If firms do not behave strategically (i. e. they act as
price takers at the spot markets and ignore their impact on total capacity at the investment
stage), the welfare maximizing market outcome (WL) is implemented.
3.3 Comparison of Market Outcomes for Strategic versus Opti-
mal Investment
In this section we compare equilibrium investment in the scenarios we analyzed in the
previous two sections and discuss how the consideration of strategic (instead of welfare
optimal) investment affects policy conclusions regarding the desirable spot market design.
Our first result shows that the traditional approach (unstrategic investment) predicts higher
investment for a more competitive spot market, while strategic firms would actually invest
less if the spot market outcome is expected to be competitive.
Theorem 3 (Investment Levels) (i) Non-strategic (welfare optimal) investment is
higher if the spot market is more competitive, i. e. XWL ≥ XWH .
(ii) Strategic firms invest less if the spot market is more competitive, i. e. XSL ≤ XSH .
Proof See appendix D 
Let us briefly provide some intuition for our result, using some characteristics of the first
order conditions as stated in theorems 1 and 2. Let us first draw the reader’s attention to the
particular structure of the first order conditions. They all equalize expected marginal profit
or welfare [LHS] with marginal cost of capacity [RHS]. Note that, at the LHS, the objective
at the investment stage (either profit or welfare) is reflected only in the integrand. That is,
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we integrate over marginal profit in cases where the firms maximize profits at the investment
stage (SH and SL) and over marginal welfare in cases where welfare is the investment
stage–objective (WL and WH). The scenario at the spot market enters exclusively into
the lower limit of integration, since the outcome of spot market competition affects the
demand scenario from which on firms are constrained given the capacities chosen at the
investment stage. Marginal profits or welfare once firms are constrained are not directly
influenced by the spot market regime, since prices are demand–driven if capacity is at its
bound.
Now consider the optimal capacity choice of strategic firms. If the firms anticipate
Cournot competition at the spot markets, marginal profit generated by additional capacity
is positive in each scenario where the firm is constrained. If firms expect competitive
behavior at the spot market, however, this is not the case. A firm thus anticipates that it
might be forced to use additional capacity although the marginal profit from using it may
be negative.16 Consequently, additional capacity is less valuable to the firms in the latter
case and investments are lower if the spot market is more competitive.
In contrast, if capacity is chosen as to maximize social welfare, an additional unit of
capacity has a positive impact whenever the spot market price is above marginal cost (which
is always the case). As already mentioned, firms are constrained earlier if spot market
behavior is more competitive. This implies that for any initial capacity level additional
capacity is used more often if the spot market is competitive and therefore generates a
higher increase in social welfare. Optimal investment must thus be higher for a competitive
spot market than for the case of Cournot competition at spot markets.
We have demonstrated above that for any fixed capacity level, additional capacity is
more valuable if welfare maximization is the objective (cases W ) than in case the firms
maximize profits (cases S), since expected marginal welfare is always higher than expected
marginal profit.17 An immediate result is that a social planer would always like to increase
the investment of strategic firms above the chosen level (this is also shown formally in the
proof of theorem 3).
Whereas capacities in the scenarios we analyze can be ranked unambiguously, this is
not always true when it comes to social welfare. A welfare comparison is simple and
straightforward for cases SH, WH, and WL (where welfare is increasing in this order). In
case firms choose their capacities strategically it is not obvious, however, whether welfare
is higher in case of high (Cournot) or low (competitive) spot market prices (case SH or
SL). In scenario SH firms exercise market power at the spot market, whereas in case SL
16This is the case in all demand scenarios in [θL(XSL), θH(XSH)].
17Formally, at a fixed capacity level, the critical value θD is the same in both cases, but the integrand is
pointwisely bigger in cases W than in cases S.
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spot prices are at the competitive level. Thus, in absence of capacity constraints welfare
would be higher in SL. However, at the investment stage strategic firms choose lower
capacities in case SL such that prices are higher in case SL than in SH whenever firms are
capacity constrained in both cases. Consequently, a welfare comparison of the two cases
is not straightforward and necessarily depends on details of the model’s specification. A
simplified model with linear demand demonstrates that both, an increase and a decrease
in welfare is possible and suggests that competitive prices at spot markets are particularly
undesirable from a welfare point of view if the number of firms is low. Thus, in particular
if market power already is a serious problem (few firms, Cournot spot market outcome), a
more competitive spot market reduces welfare even more. In markets with a higher number
of firms, however, the scenario with low spot market prices (SL) yields slightly higher
welfare. We come back to this issue in section 4, where we fit our model to the data of the
German electricity market. We obtain the following general results on welfare:
Theorem 4 (Welfare Comparison) (i) If investment is chosen as to maximize wel-
fare, implementation of a competitive spot market is always desirable, i.e. WWL ≥
WWH .
(ii) If investment is chosen strategically, implementation of a competitive spot market is
not always desirable, i.e. it may obtain that W SL ≤ W SH .
(iii) If investment is chosen strategically, implementation of a competitive spot market
is always less beneficial than in the case of welfare maximizing investment, i.e.(
WWL −WWH) ≥ (W SL −W SH).
Proof See appendix E 
Theorem 4 shows that accounting for the fact that firms invest strategically (as compared
to the consideration of unstrategic firms) may revert the predicted impact of spot market
design on investment incentives and welfare. It rather seems essential to have a closer
look at the particular market conditions in order to derive reliable welfare conclusions. As
an example we conduct such an analysis for the German electricity market in section 4.
There we illustrate how our model can be applied to get deeper insights on welfare and
investment effects of different degrees of spot market competition in a particular market.
Before we proceed to the empirical part, however, we address the issue of entry, which has
been ignored in out analysis up to now. As it turns out, all our results continue to hold in
a model with free entry at some given entry cost, which is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Free Entry) Suppose strategic firms can enter the market at some fixed
cost E in a free entry equilibrium. If firms expect a competitive spot market outcome, then
12
(weakly) less firms will enter the market. The statements of theorems 3 and 4 remain valid
also for the case of free entry.
Proof See appendix F 
4 An Empirical Analysis of Investment Choice in
Electricity Markets
In this section we fit our theoretical framework to a specific electricity market. For data
availability reasons we have chosen the German market, it seems unlikely that qualitatively
different results would obtain for other markets. It is our purpose to demonstrate how our
theoretical framework can be used to also empirically assess (long run) capacity and welfare
effects of electricity market liberalization. We show for example that implementation of a
competitive spot market not only leads to a drastic reduction of strategic firms’ investment
(figure 2) and a significant increase of spot market prices whenever capacity is binding
(figure 3) but also leads to a dramatic decrease of overall welfare in the case of concentrated
markets (figure 4). As an interesting side result we can also assess the competitive regime
present at a market by comparing observed market prices with those predicted by the 4
reference cases of our framework.
In order to use our theoretical model for the analysis we chose to make the following
specifications. We assume linear fluctuating demand P (Q) = θ − bQ and fluctuating but
constant marginal cost c(θ). If we sort all realizations of demand and cost according to the
differences θ− c(θ), the resulting framework satisfies assumptions 1 to 3. Furthermore, for
the sake of our applied example, we interpret the distribution over the demand scenarios
as relative frequencies which have been accurately predicted by all firms.18
Market demand: To construct fluctuating market demand, we start with hourly market
prices (from the European Energy Exchange (EEX)19) and hourly quantities consumed
(from the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE)20) for the year
2006. We chose the value of b in line with other studies on energy markets. Most studies
that estimate demand for electricity21 find short run elasticities between 0.1 and 0.5 and
18That is, in our empirical analysis we have no uncertainty but just demand fluctuation over time. In
practice, also uncertainty is relevant, leading to fatter tails of F (θ). The benchmark determined should
thus yield too high investment.
19See www.EEX.com
20See www.UCTE.org
21See, for example, Lijsen (2006) for an overview of recent contributions on that issue.
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long run elasticities between 0.3 and 0.7.22 The relevant range of prices is around P = 100
€/MWh and corresponding consumption is approximately Q = 50 GW. In our simulations
we take b from the interval [0.004, 0.007], which corresponds to elasticities between 0.5 and
0.29.
Production cost: The marginal technology which determines marginal cost of produc-
tion at the capacity bound is given by open cycle gas turbines in the case of electricity
markets (compare for example EWI and Prognos (2005)). Since investment in the last unit
of capacity (which determines total capacity) is always a marginal decision, we do not need
to specify the inframarginal technology mix for the empirical analysis. Note however, that
we need to assume that firms are symmetric in size (but not necessarily with respect to their
inframarginal technology mix). Since mark-ups in the Cournot model generally increase if
firms become asymmetric, our results yield a lower bound for the extent of market power
for a given number of firms.
The major components of variable production cost of open cycle gar turbines are gas
prices23 and prices for CO2 emission allowances.
24 The average TTF gas price in 2006 was
20 €/MWh and CO2 permissions traded on average for 9.30 €/MWh.25 The efficiency
of gas turbines currently ranges at around 37, 5%.26 The resulting daily production cost
for the year 2006 was on average 66.30 €/MWh. Daily values, as used in our empirical
analysis, are illustrated in figure 1. In our simulations we use the observed distribution but
multiply each realization by the factor f from the range [0.9, 1.1].
Investment Cost: Since we analyze investment incentives based solely on one year, we
break down investment cost of open cycle gas turbines to annuities.27 In order to take
construction time of gas turbine plants into account we consider investment cost on the
basis of data from the year 2000. We assume perfect foresight, i.e. all cost components have
been predicted accurately by the firms at the time of their investment decision. We base
22E.g. Beenstock et al. (1999), Bjorner and Jensen (2002), Filippini Pachuari (2002), Booinekamp (2007),
and many others.
23Daily values from the Dutch Hub TTF, corrected for transportation cost.
24Daily data taken from the EEX. The emission-coefficient for natural gas is set by the German ministry
of environment at 56t CO2/TJ which corresponds to 0.2016t CO2/MWh. Compare Umweltbundesamt
(2004).
25Recall that we do not use the averages but the daily values in our simulation.
26See 2006 GTW Handbook or EWI and Prognos (2005).
27The results will thus only yield a benchmark for current profitability of investment. Provided, however,
that yearly demand is increasing over time (and that strategic timing of investment is not an issue) our
procedure should yield accurate predictions, even though once installed capacities cannot be removed the
subsequent year.
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Figure 1: Production Cost in the Year 2006.
investment cost on the following two studies: First, a study on the German energy market
commissioned by the German Parliament (2002), with scenarios for investment decisions
summarized in Weber and Swider (2004) [in the following GP/WS]. Second, Energiereport
III, a study conducted by the Institute of Energy Economics (EWI) in Cologne and Prognos
(2000) for the the German Ministry of Economics [in the following EWI/P].
The relevant annuity is determined as follows: Total investment cost ranges between
279 €/KW (GP/WS) and 300 €/KW (EWI/P). Annual fixed cost of running a gas turbine
is already included in GP/WS, and is given by 8 €/KWa in EWI/P. This value is corrected
by the average availability of gas turbines, which, in Germany, is given by 94%.28 Based
on a financial horizon of 20 years and an interest rate of 10 % this yields annuities of
34863 €/MWa (GP/WS) and 45998 €/MWa (EWI/P). Finally, the free allotment of CO2
allowances granted to new power plants results in a de facto reduction of the annuity by the
net value of the allocated allowances. Calculating their value on the basis of the average
market price in 2006 yields 6305.3 €/MWa. The range of relevant annuities which we use
in our simulation is consequently given by [28558, 39692] €/MWa.
Simulation: Based on the above calibration of our framework we are now able to de-
termine equilibrium investment and total welfare for a given number of firms for all four
benchmark scenarios. The numerical computations are based directly on the theoretical
results derived in theorems 1 and 2. In order to assess the robustness of our results, we
do not perform the analysis for single parameter values but conduct a simulation analysis.
28Compare VGB Powertech (2006).
15
That is, we take the above specified plausible ranges of the parameters b, f , and k as sup-
port of uniformly distributed random variables and compute results for 1000 independent
random draws. For each random draw (b, f, k) we thus determine the distribution of θ and
then solve numerically for the four different benchmark scenarios SH, SL, WH, and WL.
The simulation procedure allows us to state confidence intervals for our results on total
industry investment and welfare.
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Figure 2: Investment Levels in all Four Cases.
Results: Figure 2 shows — for different numbers of firms — total investment in all four
scenarios we discuss. In the figure, the big symbols represent the average value while the two
smaller symbols of the same type determine the 90 % confidence interval of our simulation.
Obviously, predicted capacities are not very sensitive to changes in the parameters. The
first best investment does not change in the number of firms since we assume that each
firm’s marginal generating unit is a gas turbine, independently of the number of firms and
the level of demand. Strategic capacity choice prior to Cournot spot markets (scenario
SH) is at only 50 % of the optimal level for the monopoly case, while it is at 80 % of
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the optimal level for four firms. The graph illustrates that the presence of market power
not only affects spot prices, but also has a strong effect on capacity choices. Total capacity
installed in Germany in 2006 was approximately 68 GW in a market with four large firms.29
The relatively high level of actual capacity as compared to our results reflects the fact in
the pre-liberalization period (i.e. before 1998) generators where subject to a rate of return
regulation that imposed excessive investment incentives.
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Figure 3: Price Distribution in the Hours where Capacity is Binding, Cases SH, SL, WH,
WL, and Observed Prices.
From the predicted capacity levels we now compute the price distribution for those
hours where capacity is predicted to be binding in the Cournot game. Since we want to
compare predicted prices to the observed price distribution, we choose (in accordance with
the German market structure) a scenario of four firms. We, moreover, choose the mean
values of the parameter intervals which we used in our simulations, i.e. b = 0.0055, and k =
35430/MWa.30 For our data set strategic firms are capacity constrained in approximately
1107 hours (12.6 % of the year).31 Figure 3 provides the observed price distribution (grey
line), as well as the predicted price distributions during the hours with a binding capacity
29The German market consists essentially of four large players. Two of them (RWE and E.on) have a
market share of 26 % each, while the two smaller ones (ENBW and Vattenfall) together cover 30 % of the
market each. Compare, e.g., Monopolkommission (2007).
30We could also determine the price distribution for ranges of parameters. Since capacities have turned
out not to be very sensitive to changes in the parameters, however, we chose to use mean values to make
our illustration more readable.
31Our predicted values match the empirical observations. Due to Umweltbundesamt (2004), gas turbines
run approximately 10 % of the time.
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constraint, separately for scenarios WL, WH, SH, and SL (black lines). In order to make the
differences more visible, in the figure we focus on prices in the interval [0, 500] and provide
information on the highest price realizations in the legend. Obviously, for the parameter
configuration we chose, observed prices are above predicted prices in the first best scenario
but well below predicted prices in the Cournot market game. All depicted prices reflect the
willingness to pay for an additional unit of capacity that cannot be produced in the short
run. Notice that the relatively low level of observed prices (as compared to the Cournot
scenario) may well be due to the fact that currently firms have more capacity installed than
they would have chosen in a liberalized regime.32 Strategic investment would strongly affect
the price distribution, as comparison of the curves for the cases WL and SH illustrates.
Obviously, there is a strong potential for market power not only in the short run, but also
at the investment stage.
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Figure 4: Welfare Differences relative to Case SH for Cases SL, WH, and WL.
Finally, figure 4 illustrates the welfare effect that results from more competitive spot
market behavior (e. g. enforced by the regulatory authorities). All welfare differences are
calculated in relation to the strategic investment game with high spot market prices. Again,
we ran simulations using the relevant parameter ranges. Big symbols represent average
welfare differences while small symbols are the 90 % confidence intervals. As we have
already seen from the theoretical analysis and from figure 2, imposing marginal cost prices
at the spot market considerably decreases equilibrium investment. The figure shows that
32In the pre-liberalization period, generators where subject to a rate of return regulation that imposed
excessive investment incentives.
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if the number of firms in the market is low, competitive spot market behavior significantly
decreases total welfare (as compared to Cournot spot markets). Only if the number of
firms is four or higher, total welfare is increasing. Thus, our analysis demonstrates that
regulatory intervention only at the spot market does not necessarily have the desired effect
if firms choose their capacities strategically.
The figure moreover illustrates the welfare effect of intervention only at the investment
stage (scenario WH) and of implementation of the welfare optimum. As it becomes clear
from the graph, performance of the Cournot market game is getting very close to the welfare
optimum as the number of competitors becomes large. We also observe that, while the effect
of increasing capacities given that firms have market power at the spot market is moderate
for all market structures, intervention at the spot market may have relatively large negative
effects on welfare if the number of firms is low.
5 Conclusion
It has been the purpose of this article to investigate in how far electricity spot market
design influences firms’ investment decisions and how desirable electricity spot market de-
sign should look like when taking into account investment decisions. In this paper we have
provided a model of strategic investment prior to a series of spot markets with fluctuating
and potentially uncertain demand and production cost. As discussed in section 1, explicit
modeling of demand fluctuations not only makes our analysis of electricity markets more
realistic but is a necessary ingredient to study our central research question (remember:
under constant demand spot market competition is irrelevant for investment decisions).
Our framework builds on earlier research on electricity spot market competition and
extended the analysis by an investment stage. One of the most common approaches to
model electricity spot markets is the concept of supply function competition by Klemperer
and Meyer (1989) which has been applied to the case of electricity markets by Green
and Newbery (1992). The supply function game typically has multiple equilibria which
range from the competitive market outcome (lower bound) to the Cournot solution (upper
bound). Which of the equilibria is being played in a particular market likely depends
on specific market rules and institutions (compare Bushnell et al (2008)). In a dynamic
investment game a continuum of equilibria at the production stage implies very imprecise
overall equilibrium predictions ranging up to the collusive outcome (folk theorems). In
order to obtain meaningful solutions for the strategic investment game we thus limited
our analysis to the two extreme cases, the Cournot and the competitive solution. This
allowed us to pin down the effect of expected spot market prices on investment incentives
of strategic firms. Alternatively, one could use a specification of the supply function model
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that yields a unique equilibrium prediction, as for example provided by Holmberg (2008).
Let us briefly summarize our main results. We have shown that if firms invest strate-
gically the common intuition that spot markets should be more competitive is misleading.
The reason is that more competitive spot markets imply lower investment incentives, which
leads to higher scarcity prices, possibly also implies higher average prices and a welfare
reduction. Our results also hold under free entry of firms. Those findings are in contrast
to a well known result of the peak–load–pricing literature. This literature, which has an-
alyzed optimal investment in a similar environment, comes to the conclusion that optimal
investment (of non-strategic firms) is the higher, the more competitive the spot market
is. Our findings demonstrate that it is misleading to ”approximate” strategic investment
based on the intuition obtained from the peak load pricing literature. We thus show that
investment incentives and spot design cannot be considered as two separate problems but
are closely interconnected. In order to properly assess the quality of spot market design
it is indispensable to account for the interaction of investment incentives and spot market
behavior — and to model strategic players explicitly.
In order to quantify the effects we identified in the theoretical part of the paper we
fitted our model to data of the German electricity market. We derived predicted invest-
ment levels for various degrees of market concentration, and illustrated welfare effects of
changing from a Cournot spot market to a competitive spot market outcome. In a market
of four firms (which corresponds to the current situation in Germany) predicted strategic
capacity choices are at 80 % of the capacity non–strategic firms would choose prior to a
competitive spot market, while installed capacity is even at approximately 96 % of this
”competitive benchmark”. This is presumably due to high investment incentives in the
pre–liberalization period. In accordance with the relatively high current capacity level, the
observed distribution of prices in 2006 is close to the predicted ”competitive benchmark”
price distribution for those scenarios where our model predicts that capacity is binding.
Moreover, for a market structure of four firms we find a slightly positive welfare effect
of changing from a Cournot spot market to competitive spot market prices. For highly
concentrated markets (i.e. monopoly or duopoly), strategic capacity choices are far below
the level that unstrategic firms would choose. We thus find that in concentrated markets,
changing from Cournot–prices to competitive prices at the spot market would decrease the
investment incentives drastically and would therefore have a large and negative welfare
effect.
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A Analysis of the Production Stage
The appendix contains all proofs of the paper. In the first part (appendices A.1 and A.2),
we analyze spot market behavior, which we need in order to prove theorems 1 (appendix
B) and 2 (appendix C).
In the first step we characterize capacity constrained production choices at the spot
market for each θ given investment choices x. Note that we have to consider also asymmetric
investment scenarios. In order to simplify the exposition we will order the firms according
to their investment levels, i. e. x1 ≤ x2 ≤ · · · ≤ xn, throughout the paper. At the spot
market either firms engage in Cournot competition or the behave competitively (i. e. because
a social planer implements the optimal production schedule given investment choices or
because firms choose a low supply function equilibrium). In the following two subsections
we analyze both scenarios.
A.1 Properties of the Highest Spot Market Outcome
(Capacity Constrained Cournot Game)
An equilibrium of the capacity constrained Cournot game at the spot market in scenario θ
given x, qH(x, θ), satisfies simultaneously for all firms
qHi (x, θ) ∈ arg max
q
{
P (q + qH−i, θ))q− C(q, θ)
}
s.t. 0 ≤ q ≤ xi. (3)
Note that at very low values of θ all firms are necessarily unconstrained. By assumption 1
the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium [which we denote by q˜H0(θ)] is unique and symmetric
for each θ ∈ [−∞,∞].33 From (3) it follows that q˜H0i (θ) is implicitly determined by the
first order condition
P (nq˜H0i , θ) + Pq(nq˜
H0
i , θ)q˜
H0
i = Cq(q˜
H0
i , θ).
Now as θ increases, at some critical value that we denote by θH1(x), firm 1 (the one
with the lowest capacity) becomes constrained. The critical demand scenario is implicitly
determined by x1 = q
H0
1 (θ
H1). If it holds that x1 < x2, then at θ
H1(x) only firm one
becomes constrained. Then, in equilibrium, firm 1 produces at its capacity bound whereas
the remaining firms produce their equilibrium output of the Cournot game among n − 1
firms given the residual demand P (Q− x1, θ) [denoted by q˜H1i (x, θ)], which solves the first
order condition
P (x1 + (n− 1)q˜H1i , θ) + Pq(x1 + (n− 1)q˜H1i , θ)q˜H1i = Cq(q˜H1i , θ).
33See, for example Selten (1970), or Vives (2001), pp. 97/98.
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The capacity constrained Cournot equilibrium in the case where one firm is constrained is
a vector qH1(x, θ), where qH1i (x, θ) = min{xi, q˜H1(x, θ)}.
As θ increases further, we pass through n+1 cases, from case H0 (no firm is constrained)
to case Hn (all n firms are constrained). Note that two critical values θHm(x) and θHm+1(x)
coincide whenever xm = xm+1, and that it holds that θ
Hm(x) < θHm+1(x) (by assumption
2) whenever xm < xm+1.
Now we are prepared to characterize the capacity constrained Cournot equilibrium in
case Hm where m firms are constrained. In this case, the m firms with the lowest capacities
produce at their capacity bound, whereas the n−m unconstrained firms produce
q˜Hmi (x, θ) =
{
qi ∈ R : P
(
m∑
i=1
xi + (n−m) q˜Hmi , θ
)
(4)
+Pq
(
m∑
i=1
xi + (n−m) q˜Hmi , θ
)
q˜Hmi = Cq
(
q˜Hmi , θ
)}
,
The equilibrium quantities of the capacity constrained Cournot game in case Hm are given
by
qHmi (x, θ) = min{xi, q˜Hmi (x, θ)}, (5)
and aggregate production in case Hm is
QHm(x, θ) =
n∑
i=1
qHmi (x, θ). (6)
This allows us finally to pin down the profit of firm i in scenario Hm,
piHmi (x, θ) =

P
(
QHm, θ
)
xi − C (xi, θ) if i ≤ m,
P
(
QHm, θ
)
q˜Hmi (x, θ)− C
(
q˜Hmi (x, θ) , θ
)
if i > m.
(7)
Note that it holds that
dpiHmi
dxi
> 0 only if i ≤ m, and dpiHmi
dxi
= 0 otherwise, since a firm’s capac-
ity expansion only affects production at the spot market in case the firm was constrained.
Obviously, in this case the derivative must be positive.
We can finally pin down maximal social welfare generated in demand scenario θ ∈
[θHm, θHm+1] (where, given x, the m lowest capacity firms are constrained) as
WHm (x, θ) =
∫ QHm(x,θ)
0
P (Q, θ) dQ−
n∑
i=1
C
(
qHmi (x, θ) , θ
)
. (8)
(we need this in order to prove Part (WH) of theorem 2). Note that WLm only depends on
xi if firm i is constrained in scenario m, that is if i ≤ m.
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Lemma 1 (Monotonicity of θHm) dθ
Hm(x)
dxi
is strictly positive if i ≤ m (i.e. if firm i
produces at its capacity bound), and zero otherwise.
Proof θHm(x) is the demand realization from which on firm m cannot play its uncon-
strained output any more. At θHm(x) it holds that qHi (θ
Hm(x)) = q˜Hmi (θ
Hm(x)) = xm for
all i ≥ m and qHi (θHm(x)) = xi < xm for all i < m. Thus, θHm(x) is implicitly defined by
the conditions
P
(
m∑
i=1
xi + (n−m)xm, θHm(x)
)
+Pq
(
m∑
i=1
xi + (n−m)xm, θHm(x)
)
xm − Cq
(
xm, θ
Hm(x)
)
= 0.
Differentiation with respect to xi, i < m, yields
Pq (·) + Pθ (·) dθ
Hm (x)
dxi
+ Pqq (·)xm + Pqθ (·)xm dθ
Hm (x)
dxi
− Cqθ (·) dθ
Hm (x)
dxi
= 0,
and solving for dθ
Hm(x)
dxi
we obtain
dθHm (x)
dxi
= − Pq (·) + Pqq (·)xm
Pθ (·) + Pqθ (·)xm − Cqθ (·) > 0
due to assumption 1, part (i) and assumption 2, part (ii) [note that the expression in
the denominator is the cross derivative which was assumed to be positive in part (ii) of
assumption 2].
Differentiation with respect to xi, i = m, yields
(n−m+ 2)Pq (·) + Pθ (·) dθ
Hm (x)
dxi
+(n−m+ 1)Pqq (·)xm + Pxθ (·)xm dθ
Hm (x)
dxi
− Cxx (·)− Cqθ (·) dθ
Hm (x)
dxi
= 0,
and solving for dθ
Hm(x)
dxi
we obtain
dθHm (x)
dxi
= − (n−m+ 2)Pq (·) + (n−m+ 1)Pqq (·)xm − Cxx (·)
Pθ (·) + Pqθ (·)xm − Cqθ (·) > 0,
also due to assumption 1, parts (i) and assumption 2, part (ii). Finally, differentiation
with respect to xi, i > m, yields
Pθ (·) dθ
Hm (x)
dxi
+ Pxθ (·)xm dθ
Hm (x)
dxi
− Cqθ (·) dθ
Hm (x)
dxi
= 0,
which implies that dθ
Hm(x)
dxi
= 0 for i > m. 
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A.2 Properties of the Lowest Spot Market Outcome
(Competitive Behavior)
In the following we specify, for a given vector of capacities x, the competitive (welfare
optimal) production schedule for any possible demand scenario (that is, for any possible
value of θ).
Note that necessarily all firms are unconstrained for very low values of θ. It is straight-
forward to show that in the welfare optimum, all unconstrained firms produce the same
(due to convex cost). Thus, the socially optimal total quantity of each firm if all firms are
unconstrained is given by qL0i (θ) = {qi ∈ R : P (nqi, θ) = Cq (qi, θ)}.
Now, as θ increases, at some critical value, that we denote by θL1(x), firm 1 (the
lowest capacity firm) becomes constrained. The critical demand scenario θL1(x) is im-
plicitly defined by x1 = q
L0
1 (θ
L1). If it holds that x1 < x2, then at θ
L1(x) only firm
1 becomes constrained and the socially optimal (competitive) production plan implies
that firm 1 produces at its capacity bound whereas the remaining firms produce the un-
constrained optimal quantity given the residual demand P (Q − x1, θ), i. e. q˜L1i (x, θ) =
{qi ∈ R : P ((n− 1)qi + x1, θ) = Cq (qi, θ)}. The optimal production plan in scenario L1 is
a vector qL1(x, θ), where each element is given by qL1i (x, θ) = min{xi, q˜L1i (x, θ)}.
As θ increases further and more firms become constrained, we pass through n+ 1 cases,
from case L0 (no firm is constrained) to case Ln (all n firms are constrained). Note that
two critical values θLm(x) and θLm+1(x) coincide whenever xm = xm+1, and that it holds
that θLm(x) < θLm+1(x) (by assumption 2) whenever xm < xm+1.
Now we are prepared to characterize the socially optimal production plan and social
welfare generated in case Lm, where m firms are constrained. In this case, the m firms with
the lowest capacities produce at their capacity bound, whereas the n−m unconstrained firms
produce the unconstrained optimal quantity given the residual demand P (Q−∑mi=1 xi, θ),
i. e.
q˜Lmi (x, θ) =
{
qi ∈ R : P
(
m∑
j=1
xj + (n−m)qi, θ
)
= Cq(qi, θ)
}
. (9)
We denote the optimal production plan in case Lm by qLm(x, θ) where each element is
given by
qLmi (x, θ) = min{xi, q˜Lmi (x, θ)} i = 1, . . . , n. (10)
Consequently, the optimal total quantity produced in case Lm is
QLm(x, θ) =
n∑
i=1
qLmi (x, θ). (11)
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This allows to pin down firm i’s profit in scenario Lm,
piLmi (x, θ) =

P
(
QLm(x, θ), θ
)
xi − C (xi, θ) if i ≤ m,
P
(
QLm(x, θ), θ
)
q˜Lmi (x, θ)− C
(
q˜Lmi (·) , θ
)
if i > m.
(12)
We can finally pin down maximal social welfare generated in demand scenario θ ∈
[θLm, θLm+1] (where, given x, the m lowest capacity firms are constrained) as
WLm (x, θ) =
∫ QLm(x,θ)
0
P (Q, θ) dQ−
n∑
i=1
C
(
qLmi (x, θ) , θ
)
. (13)
(we need this in the proof of theorem 2). Note that WLm only depends on xi if firm i is
constrained in scenario m, that is if i ≤ m.
B Proof of Theorem 1
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1, Case SH
(Strategic Investment — High Spot Market Prices)
Now we are prepared to analyze capacity choices at the investment stage. The results
obtained for spot market behavior enable us to derive a firm i’s profit from investing xi,
given that the other firms invest x−i and quantity choices at the spot markets are given
by qHm(x, θ) for θ ∈ [θHm(x), θHm+1(x)]. Recall that when choosing capacities the firms
anticipate demand fluctuations. Thus, a firm’s profit from given levels of investments, x, is
the integral over equilibrium profits at each θ given x on the domain [−∞,∞], taking into
account the distribution over the demand scenarios. For each θ, firms anticipate equilibrium
play at the spot markets, which gives rise to one of the n+1 types of equilibria, EQH0, . . . ,
EQHm, . . . , EQHn. Note that any x > 0 gives rise to the unconstrained equilibrium if θ is
sufficiently low. As θ increases, more and more firms become constrained. Thus, a tuple of
investment levels that initially gave rise to an EQH0, then leads to an equilibrium where
first one (then two, three, . . . , and finally n) firms are constrained. In order to simplify the
exposition we define θH0 ≡ −∞ and θHn+1 ≡ ∞. Then, the profit of firm i is given by34
pii(x, q
H) =
m=n∑
m=0
∫ θHm+1
θHm
piHmi (x, θ)dF (θ)−K(xi). (14)
34Note that it is never optimal for a firm to be unconstrained at∞ and thus, we always obtain θHn ≤ ∞.
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Note that at each critical value θHm, m = 1, . . . , n it holds that piHm−1(x, θHm) =
piHm(x, θHm). Thus, pii(x, q
H) is continuous. Differentiating pii(x, q
H) yields35
dpii
(
x, qH
)
dxi
=
n∑
m=i
∫ θHm+1(x)
θHm(x)
dpiHmi (x, θ)
dxi
dF (θ)−Kx (xi) (15)
We prove part (SH) of the theorem in two steps. In part I we show existence and in
part II uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Part I: Existence of Equilibrium In the following we show that a symmetric equilib-
rium of the investment game exists if firms invest strategically and expect high spot market
prices (case SH), and that equilibrium choices xSHi =
1
n
XSH , i = 1, . . . , n, are implicitly
defined by equation (2). For this purpose it is sufficient to show quasiconcavity of firm i’s
profit given the other firms invest xSH−i , pii(xi, x
SH
−i ), which we do in the following.
Note that pii(xi, x
SH
−i ) is defined piecewisely. For xi < x
SH
i , we have to examine the
profit of firm 1 (by convention the lowest capacity firm) given that x2 = x3 = · · · = xn.
Since this implies that θH2 = · · · = θHn and thus it follows from (14) that
pi1(x1, x
SH
−1 ) =
∫ θH1(x)
−∞
piH01 (x, θ)dF (θ) +
∫ θHn(x)
θH1(x)
piH11 (x, θ)dF (θ) (16)
+
∫ ∞
θHn(x)
piHni (x, θ)dF (θ)−K(x1)
For xi > x
SH
i , the profit of firm i is the profit of the highest capacity firm (firm n according
to our convention), given all other firm have invested the same, i. e. x1 = · · · = xn−1. We
get
pin(xn, x
SH
−n ) =
∫ θHn−1(x)
−∞
piH0n (x, θ)dF (θ) +
∫ θHn(x)
θHn−1(x)
piHn−1n (x, θ)dF (θ) (17)
+
∫ ∞
θHn(x)
piHnn (x, θ)dF (θ)−K(x1)
(i) The shape of pii(xi, x
SH
−i ) for xi > x
SH
i : The second derivative of the profit function
pin is given by
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d2pin
(dxn)2
= −dθ
Hn(x)
dxn
[
dpiHnn (x, θ
Hn)
dxn
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 (xn is opt. atθHn)
f(θHn) +
∫ ∞
θHn(x)
d2piHnn (x, θ)
(dxn)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 by A1 part (iv)
f(θ)dθ < 0. (18)
35Note that continuity of pii implies that due to Leibnitz’ rule the derivatives of the integration limits
cancel out. Moreover, piHmi only changes in xi if firm i is constrained in scenario Lm, i. e. i ≤ m. Thus,
the sum does not include the cases where firm i is unconstrained, i. e. m < i.
36It is obvious that there is no incentive for any firm to deviate such that it is unconstrained at∞. Thus,
we only consider the case that all firms are constrained at ∞.
29
Note that the first term cancels out and the second term is negative by concavity of the spot
market profit function (implied by assumption 1). We find that for xi ≥ xSHi , pii(xi, xSH−i )
is concave, which implies that upwards deviations are not profitable.
(ii) The shape of pii(xi, x
SH
−i ) for xi < x
SH
i : This region is more difficult to analyze since
the profit function pi1(x1, x
SH
−1 ) is not concave. We can, however, show quasiconcavity of
pi1(x1, x
SH
−1 ). For this purpose we need lemma 2 (below) in order to complete the proof of
existence (part I). We can show quasiconcavity of pi1(x1, x
SH
−1 ) by showing that
dpi1(x
0
1, x
SH
−1 )
dx1
>
dpi1(x
SH
1 , x
SH
−1 )
dx1
= 0 for all x01 < x
SH
1 .
This holds true, since [compare also equation (15)]
dpi1(x
0
1, x
SH
−1 )
dx1
=
∫ θHn(x01,xSH−1 )
θH1(x01,x
SH
−1 )
dpiH11 (x
0
1, x
SH
−1 , θ)
dx1
dF (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by lemma 2, part (i)
+
∫ ∞
θHn(x01,x
SH
−1 )
dpiHn1 (x
0
1, x
SH
−1 , θ)
dx1
dF (θ)
≥
∫ ∞
θHn(x01,x
SH
−1 )
dpiHn1 (x
0
1, x
SH
−1 , θ)
dx1
dF (θ)
=
∫ θHn(xSH−1 ,xSH−1 )
θHn(x01,x
SH
−1 )
dpiHn1 (x
0
1, x
SH
−1 , θ)
dx1
dF (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0 by properties 1 and 2, part (ii)
+
∫ ∞
θHn(xSH1 ,x
SH
−1 )
[
dpiHn1 (x
0
1, x
SH
−1 , θ)
dx1
− dpi
Hn
1 (x
SH
1 , x
SH
−1 , θ)
dx1
]
dF (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 by lemma 2, part (ii)
+
∫ ∞
θHn(xSH1 ,x
SH
−1 )
dpiHn1 (x
SH
1 , x
SH
−1 , θ)
dx1
dF (θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
dpii(x
SH )
dxi
=0 [recall that θH1(xSH)=θHn(xSH)]
≥ 0.
To summarize, in part I (i) and (ii) we have shown that pii(xi, x
SH
i ) is quasiconcave. We
conclude that the first order condition given in theorem 1 indeed characterizes equilibrium
capacities in the investment game with Cournot–style spot market competition.
Lemma 2 [Properties of Marginal Profits at Stage Two] Suppose all firms but
firm 1 have invested symmetric capacities summarized in the vector x0−1. Firm 1 has invested
x1, less than each of the other firms. We obtain:
(i)
dpiH11 (x
0
1,x
0
−1,θ)
dx1
≥ 0 for θH1 ≤ θ ≤ θHn.
(ii)
dpiHn1 (x
′
1,x
0
−1,θ)
dx1
≥ dpiHn1 (x′′1 ,x0−1,θ)
dx1
≥ 0 for x′1 < x′′1, θHn ≤ θ ≤ ∞.
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Proof (i) The first part holds due to the fact in case firm 1 is constrained, i. e. (θ ≥ θH1),
firm 1 would like to produce more than x1 for all demand realizations θ ≥ θH1, which,
however, is not possible due to the capacity constraint.
(ii) The first inequality follows from concavity of the profit functions in the spot markets,
which is implied by assumption 1. Thus, the first order condition at each spot-market is
decreasing in x1 until q˜
H0
i , which immediately yields the first inequality of part (ii). The
second inequality is due to the fact that in case all firms are constrained, i. e. (θ ∈ [θHn,∞]),
firm 1 would like to produce more for all demand realizations θ (which is not possible because
it is constrained). 
Part II: Uniqueness In this part we show that (i) xSH is the unique symmetric equilib-
rium and (ii) that there are no asymmetric equilibria.
(i) xSH is the unique symmetric equilibrium. If capacities are equal, i. e. x01 = x
0
2 =
· · · = x0n, we have
dpii(x
0)
dxi
=
∫ ∞
θHn(x0)
[P (nx0i , θ) + Pq(nx
0
i , θ)x
0
i − Cq(x0i , θ)]f(θ)dθ −Kx(x0i ).
Differentiation yields37
d2pii(x
0)
(dxi)2
=
∫ ∞
θHn(x0)
[
(n+ 1)Pq(nx
0
i , θ) + nPqq(nx
0
i , θ)x
0
i − Cqq(x0i , θ)
]
dF (θ)−Kxx(x0i ) < 0,
which is negative due to assumption 1. Thus, since dpii(x
SH)
dxi
= 0 and moreover pii(x) is
concave along the symmetry line, no other symmetric equilibrium can exist.
(ii) There cannot exist an asymmetric equilibrium. Any candidate for an asymmetric
equilibrium xˆ can be ordered such that xˆ1 ≤ xˆ2 ≤ · · · ≤ xˆn, where at least one inequality
has to hold strictly. This implies xˆ1 < xˆn. The profit of firm n can be obtained by setting
i = n in equation (14), and the first derivative is given by
dpin
dxn
=
∫ ∞
θHn(x)
dpiHnn (x, θ)
dxn
f(θ)dθ −Kx(xn).
It is easy to show that firm n’s profit function is concave by examination of the second
derivative [see equation (18)]. Thus, any asymmetric equilibrium xˆ, if it exists, must satisfy
dpin(xˆ)
dxn
= 0. We now show that whenever it holds that dpin(xˆ)
dxn
= 0, firm 1’s profit is increasing
in x1 at xˆ (which implies that no asymmetric equilibria exist).
From equation (15) it follows that the first derivative of firm 1’s profit function is given
by
dpi1
dx1
=
∫ θH2(x)
θH1(x)
dpiHn1 (x, θ)
dx1
f(θ)dθ + · · ·+
∫ ∞
θHn(x)
dpiHn1 (x, θ)
dx1
f(θ)dθ −Kx(x1).
37Differentiation works as in (18).
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Note that all the integrals in dpi1
dx1
are positive since firm 1 is constrained at all demand
realizations and therefore would want to increase its production. Thus, we have
dpi1
dx1
>
∫ ∞
θHn(x)
dpiHn1 (x, θ)
dx1
f(θ)dθ −Kx(x1),
where the RHS are simply the last two terms of dpi1
dx1
. Note furthermore that xˆ1 < xˆn also
implies that Kx(xˆ1) < Kx(xˆn) (due to assumption 3) and
dpi1(xˆ)
dx1
= P (xˆ, θ) + Pq(xˆ, θ)xˆ1 − Cq(xˆ1, θ) < P (xˆ, θ) + Pq(xˆ, θ)xˆn − Cq(xˆn, θ) = dpin(xˆ)
dxn
(due to assumption 1). Now we can conclude that
dpi1
dx1
>
∫ ∞
θHn(x)
dpiHn1 (x, θ)
dx1
f(θ)dθ −Kx(x1) >
∫ ∞
θHn(x)
dpiHnn (x, θ)
dxn
f(θ)dθ −Kx(xn) = 0.
The last equality is due to the fact that this part is equivalent to the first order condition of
firm n, which is satisfied at xˆ by construction. To summarize, we have shown that dpi1
dx1
> 0,
which implies that there exist no asymmetric equilibria, since at any equilibrium candidate,
firm 1 has an incentive to increase its capacity.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1, Case SL
(Strategic Investment — Low Spot Market Prices)
If firms behave competitively at the spot markets, firm i’s spot market–profit in scenario θ
is given by (12). The investment stage expected profit of firm i is obtained by integrating
over all profits associated with each demand realization,38
pii(x, q
L) =
n∑
m=0
∫ θLm+1(x)
θLm(x)
piLmi (x, θ)dF (θ)−K (xi) . (19)
Thus, the first order condition is
dpii
(
x, qL
)
dxi
=
n∑
m=i
∫ θLm+1(x)
θLm(x)
dpiLmi (x, θ)
dxi
dF (θ)−Kx (xi) . (20)
Now note that dpii
dxi
> 0 at X = 0 (since investment is gainful), that dpii
dxi
< 0 for some finite
value of X, and that dpii
dxi
is continuous. Thus, a corner solution is not possible, and we
have at least one point where (2) is satisfied and dpii
dxi
is decreasing. Note, however, that
this does not assure existence. In fact, in the scenario considered here a firm’s investment
stage profit is not even quasiconcave, and it is not possible to reformulate the game as a
supermodular game.
38We define θL0 = −∞ and θLn+1 =∞.
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Now assume constant marginal production cost. Note that in the case of constant
marginal production costs it is, independently of the capacity choices firms made at the
investment stage, always true that either all firms are constrained at p = Cq(·, θ), or none
of them. Thus, it holds that θL1(x) = · · · = θLn(x).
In order to prove part (SL) of theorem 1, we apply theorem 2.1 of Amir and Lamb-
son (2000), p. 239. They show that the standard Cournot oligopoly game has at least one
symmetric equilibrium and no asymmetric equilibria whenever demand P (·) is continuously
differentiable and decreasing, cost C(·) is twice continuously differentiable and nondecreas-
ing and, moreover, the cross partial derivative dpi(X,q)
dX−idX
> 0, where X denotes total capacity
and X−i capacity chosen by the firms other than i. In order to see that the results of Amir
and Lambson apply to our setup, note that our game is equivalent to a game where firms
choose output given the expected demand and cost function. Note that if the first best
outcome occurs whenever capacity is sufficient, it follows that expected inverse demand is
given by
EP (X) =
∫ θLn(x)
−∞
P
(
QL0 (θ) , θ
)
dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θLn(x)
P (X, θ) dF (θ) , (21)
and expected cost is given by
EC(xi) =
∫ θLn(x)
−∞
C
(
qL0i , θ
)
dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θLn(x)
C (xi, θ) dF (θ) +K (xi) , (22)
Note that EP (X) is strictly decreasing in X and EC(xi) is strictly increasing in xi, but
they do not satisfy assumption 1, part (i), which is why existence and uniqueness are not
implied by standard (textbook) analysis.39 However, Amir and Lambson’s assumptions40
are satisfied, since the cross partial derivative
dpi2(X, qH)
dX−idX
= −dθ
Ln(x)
dX
[−P (X, θLn(x)) + Cq(X −X−i, θLn(x))]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 at θLn(x)
f(θLn(x))
+
∫ ∞
θLn(X)
[−Pq(X, θ) + Cqq(X −X−i, θ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
f(θ)dθ
is positive. This guarantees that we have at least one symmetric equilibrium and no
asymmetric equilibria in case of constant marginal cost.
39In fact, the expected profit function is not even quasiconcave, as it is easily seen by inspecting its
second derivative.
40The assumptions are: P (·) is continuously differentiable with Pq(·) < 0, C(·) is twice continuously
differentiable and nondecreasing, and Pq(X)− Cqq(xi) < 0.
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C Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of theorem 2 (where welfare maximizing capacities are chosen) is quite similar to
the proof of theorem 1. We therefore give only a brief sketch, and refer to a working paper
version of the paper (Grimm and Zoettl (2007)) for an extensive version of the proof.
In order to prove part (WL), we consider for each realization of θ the welfare maximum
at the spot market for fixed capacity choices. Integration over all realizations of spot market
demand then yields expected welfare, which is given by the following expression:
W(x, qL) =
n∑
m=0
∫ θLm+1(x)
θLm(x)
WLm(x, θ)dF (θ)−
n∑
i=1
K (xi) . (23)
Note that at each critical value θLm, m = 1, . . . , n, it holds that WLm−1(x, θLm) =
WLm(x, θLm). Thus, W(x) is continuous. Differentiating W(x) yields the following first
order condition:
dW(x, qL)
dxi
=
n∑
m=i
∫ θLm+1(x)
θLm(x)
dWLm (x, θ)
dxi
dF (θ)−Kx (xi) = 0. (24)
After verification of the second order conditions we can conclude that the above first order
condition (24) yields a unique and symmetric first best solution as stated in theorem 2,
part (WL).
In order to proof part (WH), we need to determine welfare generated at the spot market
at each realization of θ for fixed capacity choices given Cournot competition. Expected
welfare is then again determined by integrating over all realizations of spot market demand
and evaluation of first and second order conditions yields a unique and symmetric solution
stated in the theorem.
D Proof of Theorem 3
In appendices B and C we have shown that all games analyzed throughout this article
have only symmetric equilibria. In the remaining three proofs we therefore simplify our
notation of the critical demand scenarios in case of high and low demand. In the following,
the critical demand realization θDj, where D = {L,H} and j = 0, . . . , n will be denoted
by θD (since in a symmetric solution all firms are constrained from the very same demand
realization on) and unconstrained industry output QDj, where D = {L,H} and j = 0, . . . , n
can be denoted by QD for symmetric investment.
Now consider the first order conditions that implicitly define total capacities in the four
scenarios considered, as given in theorems 1 and 2. Recall that (i) Pq(X, θ) < 0, and note
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that (ii) θH(x) > θL(x) for all x. Furthermore, (iii) at (below, above) the demand realization
θH(xSH) we have that Pq(X
SH , θ)X
SH
n
+ P (XSH , θ) − Cq( 1nXSH , θ) = 0 (< 0, > 0). Thus,
the lefthand–sides of the first order conditions can be ordered as follows:
WL :
∫ ∞
θL(x)
[
P (X, θ)− Cq
(
1
n
X, θ
)]
dF (θ) (25)
WH : ≥
∫ ∞
θH(x)
[
P (X, θ)− Cq
(
1
n
X, θ
)]
dF (θ)
SH : >
∫ ∞
θH(x)
[
Pq (X, θ)
1
n
X + P (X, θ)− Cq
(
1
n
X, θ
)]
dF (θ)
SL : ≥
∫ ∞
θL(x)
[
Pq (X, θ)
1
n
X + P (X, θ)− Cq
(
1
n
X, θ
)]
dF (θ)
Note that according to theorems 1 and 2, the total capacities are determined as the values
of X where the respective term equals Kx
(
1
n
XZ
)
, Z ∈ {WL, WH, SH, SL}. Recall that
in all cases we get interior solutions and note that the above terms (except for the one
that determines XSL) are decreasing in X, while Kx is increasing in X. This immediately
implies XWL ≥ XWH > XSH .
In order to see why the ranking stated in the theorem also holds for case SL, note that
the above term in scenario SH is strictly decreasing in X, whereas in scenario SL the left
hand side (LHS) of the first order condition satisfies LHS(0) > Kx(0) (since investment is
gainful) and LHS(X) < Kx(X) for X high enough. Since Kx(X) is increasing in X, this
immediately implies that for any equilibrium investment XSL it holds that XSH ≥ XSL.
E Proof Theorem 4
Part (i). We first determine welfare generated in case WL, where firms behave competi-
tively at the spot markets and investment choice XWL is made such as to maximize welfare.
At all spot markets θ < θL(XWL) firms produce unconstrained output at marginal cost,
generating welfare given by WL(θ). For all spot markets θ ≥ θL(XWL) firms produce at
their capacity bounds given by XWL, generating welfare W˜L(θ,X).
WL(θ) =
∫ QL(θ)
0
P (Y, θ)Y − nC(Y/n, θ)dY, and W˜L(θ,X) =
∫ X
0
P (Y, θ)Y − nC(Y/n, θ)dY
Total welfare WWL is thus given by:
WWL =
∫ θL(XWL)
−∞
WL(θ)dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θL(XWL)
W˜L(θ,XWL)dF (θ)− nK(XWL/n)
Notice that for given investment choice a perfectly competitive spot market yields the
welfare optimal spot market outcome. Since investment is chosen such as to maximize
welfare, this implies that case WL leads to the overall first best market outcome.
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We now derive welfare generated in case WH. Firms choose spot market output QH(θ)
strategically. For θ < θL(XWH) capacity is not binding, we denote generated welfare at
those spot markets by WH(θ). For θ ≥ θL(XWH) firms produce at their capacity bounds,
we denote generated welfare by W˜H(θ,X).
WH(θ) =
∫ QH(θ)
0
P (Y, θ)Y − nC(Y/n, θ)dY, and W˜H(θ,X) =
∫ X
0
P (Y, θ)Y − nC(Y/n, θ)dY
Total welfare WWH is then given by:
WWH =
∫ θH(XWH)
−∞
WH(θ)dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θH(XWH)
W˜H(θ,XWH)dF (θ)− nK(XWH/n)
Notice that in case WH, spot market output for given investment is not chosen such as
to maximize welfare, but as the equilibrium of strategically interacting firms. This directly
implies that welfare in case WH is strictly lower than in case WL.
Part (ii). We now compare welfare generated in the cases SL and SH. In case SL firms
at all spot markets θ < θL(XSL) produce unconstrained output at marginal cost, generating
welfare WL(θ). For all spot markets θ ≥ θL(XSL) firms produce at their capacity bounds,
generating welfare W˜L(θ,X). We obtain for total welfare in case SL
WSL =
∫ θL(XSL)
−∞
WL(θ)dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θL(XSL)
W˜L(θ,XSL)dF (θ)− nK(XSL/n). (26)
In case SH, firms choose spot market output QH(θ) strategically. For θ < θL(XSH)
capacity is not binding and welfare WH(θ) is generated at each spot market. For θ ≥
θL(XSH) firms produce at their capacity bounds, generating welfare W˜H(θ,X). We obtain
for total welfare in case SH
WSH =
∫ θH(XSH)
−∞
WH(θ)dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θH(XSH)
W˜H(θ,XSH)dF (θ)− nK(XSH/n). (27)
For low spot market realizations θ < θL(XSL) capacities are binding neither in case SH,
nor in case SL. For those low demand realizations welfare generated at more competitive
spot markets (i.e. case SL) is clearly higher than for strategic spot market outcomes (i.e.
case SH). For high spot market realizations θ ≥ θL(XSH), capacities are binding in both
cases SH and SL. Welfare generated in case SH is now strictly bigger, since investment
strictly exceeds investment of case SL (see theorem 3). Which of those two effect dominates,
depends on the precise structure of the market and the pattern of demand fluctuation. As
we find, especially when market concentration is high, however, the implementation of a
competitive spot market leads to a reduction of overall welfare. Moreover, as illustrated in
figure 4, especially in highly strategic environments the impact of erroneous market design
is substantial, however.
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Part (iii). For the case of strategic investment, desirability of the more competitive
spot market outcome depends on the precise parameters of the market game, as we have
established in part (ii) of the theorem. In part (iii) we now establish a weaker statement,
which is always true, however. As we find, a market designer will always overestimate the
beneficial impact of implementing the competitive spot market outcome if basing his anal-
ysis on a framework of optimal investment but not of investment in a market equilibrium.
In order to proof the theorem, we have to show
(
WWL +W SH
) ≥ (WWH +W SL). This
can be verified by point wise inspection for all spot market realizations θ.
For spot market θ < θH(XSH) firms can produce the unconstrained strategic spot
market output in the cases SH and WH. For case SH this is true by definition of θH(XSH)
and for case WH this is true since XSH ≤ XWH , as established in the proof of theorem
3. welfare generated in the cases SH and WH is thus identical for all those spot market
realizations. Likewise, since XWL > XSL, welfare generated in case WL weakly exceeds
welfare generated in case SL for those spot market realizations.
For θ ≥ θH(XSH) firms produce at the investment boundary for both cases SH and
SL. For case SH this is true by definition of θH(XSH) and for case SL this is true since
XSL ≤ XSH , as established in the proof of theorem 3. As already established in part (ii),
whenever firms are constrained at the spot market, welfare generated in case SH clearly
exceeds welfare generated in case SL. Moreover, case WL always outperforms case WH in
terms of welfare, no matter if capacities are binding or not (compare part (i)).
F Proof of Theorem 5
We now consider the case of a free entry equilibrium. Entry is costly and firms enter the
market as long as profits are non–negative. We first show that weakly less firms enter
the market in case SL as compared to case SH in a free entry equilibrium, i.e. nSL ≤
nSH . Remember in case SH, for θ < θH , firms produce in an unconstrained spot market
equilibrium, and are capacity constrained for all higher demand realizations41. In case SL
for θ < θL firms produce unconstrained spot market output at marginal cost and produce
at the capacity bound for all higher demand realizations. We derive firms’ profits for both
cases (SL and SH).
41The free entry analysis obviously anticipates the symmetric equilibrium, established in theorem 1 as
the solution of the investment market game. In order to save on notation we omit equilibrium investment
XSH and XSL in the argument of the critical spot market realizations θH(XSH) and θL(XSL) respectively.
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piSHi (n) =
∫ θH
−∞
piH0i
(
QH , θ
)
dF (θ) +
∫ θL
θH
piHni
(
XSH , θ
)
dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θL
piHni
(
XSH , θ
)
dF (θ)−K (XSH/n) (28)
piSLi (n) =
∫ θH
−∞
piL0i
(
QL, θ
)
dF (θ) +
∫ θL
θH
piL0i
(
QL, θ
)
dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θL
piLni
(
XSL, θ
)
dF (θ)−K (XSL/n) (29)
Notice that the expressions for firms’ profits have been expanded, such as to contain both
critical demand realizations θH and θL. We now show that for any fixed number n of firms,
profits are lower in case SL than in case SH, i.e. piSHi (n) ≥ piSLi (n).
First observe that piH0i
(
QH , θ
)
> piH0i
(
QL, θ
)
for all θ < θH . This follows from the
observation that firms are unconstrained at those spot markets, and profits for strategic
spot market behavior are higher, than under perfect competition.
In order to compare the remaining terms of expressions (28) and (29), have to make use
of the equilibrium conditions derived in theorem 1.42 We obtain for the remaining three
terms of expression (28):∫ θL
θH
piHni
(
XSH , θ
)
dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θL
piHni
(
XSH , θ
)
dF (θ)−K
(
XSH
n
)
= (30)∫ ∞
θH
−Pq(·)
(
XSH
n
)2
+
(
Cq (·) X
SH
n
− C
(
XSH
n
, θ
))
dF (θ)) +
(
Kx (·) X
SH
n
−K
(
XSH
n
))
Analogously we rewrite the last three terms of expression (29) and obtain:∫ θL
θH
piL0i
(
QL, θ
)
dF (θ) +
∫ ∞
θL
piLni
(
XSL, θ
)
dF (θ)−K
(
XSL
n
)
= (31)∫ θL
θH
−Pq(·)
(
QL
n
)2
+
(
Cq (·) Q
L
n
− C
(
QL
n
, θ
))
dF (θ)) +∫ ∞
θL
−Pq(·)
(
XSL
n
)2
+
(
Cq (·) X
SL
n
− C
(
XSL
n
, θ
))
dF (θ)) +
(
Kx (·) X
SL
n
−K
(
XSL
n
))
Expressions (30) and (31) can now be compared point wisely for all θ > θH . Observe
that
(
−Pq(Y, θ)
(
Y
n
)2)
is strictly increasing in Y due to assumption 1 (i). Moreover
(Cq (y) y − C (y)) and (Kx (y) y −K (y)) are increasing in y due to concavity of production
and investment cost (assumptions 1 (ii) and 3). As established in theorem 3, XSL < XSH ,
furthermore, unconstrained production QL, by definition, is always below the capacity, i.e.
QL ≤ XSL. This directly implies, however, that expression (30) is strictly bigger than
expression (31).
42We expand the equilibrium conditions
∫∞
θH
P + Pqxi − CqdF (θ) = Kx as follows:∫ ∞
θH
Pxi − C (xi) dF (θ)−K (xi) =
∫ ∞
θH
(−Pqxi + Cq)xi − C (xi) dF (θ) +Kxxi −K (xi) .
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We thus established that for a fixed number of firms active on the market, profits of
firms are strictly lower in case SL than in case SH. That is, when investment is chosen
strategically by a fixed number of firms, overall profits are lower under competitive spot
markets than for strategic behavior at the spot markets. This implies, furthermore, that
in a free entry equilibrium weakly less firms will enter the market in case SL than in case
SH, i.e. nSL ≤ nSH .
We finally show that indeed the statements of theorems 3 and 4 are true also under
the hypothesis of free entry. From theorem 3 we obtain XSL
(
nSL
) ≤ XSH (nSL) for
some fixed number nSL of firms active in either case. Since under free entry nSL ≤ nSH
and since investment XSH is increasing in the number of firms active on the market we
can directly conclude that XSL
(
nSL
) ≤ XSH (nSH). The same reasoning holds true for
the welfare analysis of theorem 4. We obtained W SL
(
nSL
) ≤ W SH (nSL) for a fixed
number of firms active on the market. Since under free entry nSL ≤ nSH and since welfare
W SH is increasing in the number of firms active on the market, we can conclude that
W SL
(
nSL
) ≤ W SH (nSH).
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